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If we naively, simply scale up the brain—
more of the same—wewould not necessar-
ily have a brain that is qualitatively better.
Taking the analogy from visual ecology—
the eagle—it could just see better at greater
heights (Snyder and Miller, 1978)—more
of the same!
Instead, let us ask how to design a brain
that is qualitatively better in some sense,
say at being creative. One bottleneck to
creativity is our inability to see things in
a new light, free of prior interpretations.
Once a pattern is identified and labeled,
it is difficult to identify different patterns
and find alternative solutions. A classic
example is the duck/rabbit illusion, where
we can see either a duck or a rabbit but
not be simultaneously aware of both. We
are blinded by our mindsets, by our exper-
tise! This presumably is a consequence
of our hypothesis-driven, cognitive make
up. Hypotheses are mental templates that
encapsulate expectations of the world as
derived from past experience—a brilliant
strategy for coping rapidly with partial
information in a dynamic but famil-
iar environment (Snyder et al., 2004;
Bossomaier et al., 2009). [Although we use
the human brain as an example, there is
considerably evidence that the concept-
dominated architecture is characteristic of
the mammalian brain, and possibly also
in birds, in particular corvids (e.g., Emery
and Clayton, 2004)].
Our brain can recall a seemingly unlim-
ited number of meaningful patterns and
labels, but often not the attributes that
compose them. In contrast, some autistic
savants can recall a seemingly unlimited
amount of details, without any attempt
to impose meaning (e.g., Wiltshire, 1989).
But, savants are less prone to cognitive
illusions (Bogdashina, 2003) and that fact
gives us a clue for a “better” brain—
a brain that is hypothesis driven, but is
resilient to cognitive illusions, a brain that
can in addition see the world with direct
perception and thus open to alternative
interpretations (Snyder, 2009).
A better brain—natural or artificial—
would have tremendous implications for
our world. Most importantly, it would
boost creativity, both in art and in science.
Better decisions would be made in poli-
tics and business, and long-standing issues
such as pollution and hunger would be
more likely to be solved. How do we go
about to developing such a brain?
A possible strategy is to start from the
things humans are doing so well as a result
of our adaptation to the environment due
to evolutionary pressure, and then to con-
sider why the products of this adaptation
sometimes are associated with penalties.
Finding a way to fix these instances of
penalties in humans leads to insights that
can be further applied to the design of
better brains.
As a first example, consider visual per-
ception. Overall, our eye and our visual
cortex, honed by millions of years of evo-
lution, work very well. However, human
visual perception can be fooled surpris-
ingly easily by perceptual and cognitive
illusions. We can see things that do not
exist (e.g., Escher’s impossible figures), do
not see things that exist (e.g., reading
words rather than seeing black and white
pixels), see two objects from the same
drawing (e.g., the duck-rabbit illusion),
and grossly misjudge the dimensions of
objects (e.g., the Ebbinghaus and Ponzo
illusions). How can we avoid these illu-
sions? What would this tell us about brain
design?
As a second example, consider exper-
tise. Experts can show extreme adapta-
tions to their environment and are capa-
ble of great achievements (Ericsson et al.,
2006; Didierjean and Gobet, 2008). Tennis
players can return services with balls
hit at more than 200 km/h, and they
can even counter-attack when doing so.
Mnemonists can memorize more than 100
digits read at 1 s each. Some chess players
can play more than 30 games simultane-
ously, without seeing the board and the
pieces. But expertise sometimes fails. In
their study on the Einstellung effect in
chess, Bilalic´ et al. (2008a,b, 2010) showed
that even experts can fail to find an opti-
mal solution when a common solution
comes first to their mind. The effect is
surprisingly powerful: compared to con-
trol positions, players lose about 1 stan-
dard deviation in skill when showing
the Einstellung effect. This illustrates the
strength of the schemas we hold in long-
term memory and the power that our
preconceptions have on our mind.
What are the solutions to percep-
tual/cognitive illusions, such as those
displayed in visual illusions and in the
Einstellung effect? Intuitively, there are
two main approaches. The first one is to
use more knowledge (i.e., scaling up) and
could be called “quantitative scaling.” It
could be summarized by the phrase “more
of the same.” This is the standard approach
in computer science and artificial
intelligence.
Quantitative scaling has had some
tremendous successes in artificial
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intelligence, such as the victory of Deep
Blue against chess world champion
Kasparov in 1997 (Campbell et al., 2002).
But increase of knowledge does not always
provide a solution; for example, many
visual illusions persist in spite of our
knowledge that they exist. Indeed, quanti-
tative scaling has also met with problems
in artificial intelligence. Most notably, it
has failed in many attempts, such as play-
ing Go at master level (Gobet et al., 2004;
Hsu, 2007), providing computers with
common sense (McCarthy, 2007; Sarbo,
2007), and in general developing genuine,
domain-general intelligence and creativity
(Bridewell and Langley, 2010; Jennings,
2010).
A second approach could be called
“qualitative scaling.” In essence, this leads
to the definition and use of new concep-
tual spaces. To get to these new spaces, we
need to break apart the existing conceptual
structures, whereas in quantitative scal-
ing we build increasingly elaborate con-
cepts on top of what we have already.
A classic example is Einstein’s conjec-
ture that the speed of light was constant
in all inertial reference frames, leading
to conclusions very different to those of
Newtonian physics. Serialism, cubism or
simply Dadaism itself illustrate this notion
in the arts.
We know that individuals with autism
are less susceptible to some illusions
(Walter et al., 2009; Mitchell et al., 2010),
and that they process information in a less
holistic way (Nakahachi et al., 2008), for
example paying more attention to details,
which can result in savant skills such as
extreme memory for detail and speed in
counting objects (numerosity) (Soulieres
et al., 2010). We also know that some
savant skills can be artificially induced in
normal individuals, for example by low-
frequency repetitive transcranial magnetic
stimulation (Snyder et al., 2006; Boggio
et al., 2009; Snyder, 2009) or transcra-
nial direct current stimulation (Chi and
Snyder, 2012).
Our key argument is that our nor-
mal cognition, while very efficient, tends
to develop cognitive mind sets. Breaking
these mind sets can help explore new
conceptual spaces, and thus be more cre-
ative. Rather than reorganizing knowledge
in some superficial way, we propose two
radical approaches. The first is to inhibit
some concepts or a class of concepts (e.g.,
a group of concepts that are strongly
connected or the most likely concepts in
a given situation). The second is to avoid
concepts altogether (or at least as much as
possible), by using raw perception instead,
thus imitating the autistic mind. Our pro-
posal is thus that creativity can be boosted
by decreasing conceptual processing and
increasing the role of low-level perceptual
processing.
Our proposal raises intriguing issues.
What is the link between concepts and raw
perception? Are they two discrete states,
or are they part of a more graded space?
How can “raw perception” mitigate or
even eliminate Einstellung-like effects? Is
raw perception enough? Autism seems to
offer a counter-example, where the lack
of use of concepts leads to serious intel-
lectual and social impairments. But is it
necessarily so?
The history of human thought pro-
vides us with creativity examples where
the inhibiting-concept strategy was used
(possibly unconsciously) and worked.
When 2005 Nobel Laureates Marshall
and Warren (1984) correctly proposed
that stomach ulcers were caused by heli-
cobacter pylori rather than by excess
acid, they had to jettison a whole raft
of concepts. There are also examples of
this in AI research—for instance com-
puter chess and checkers, where new
profound insights were gained from brute
force search, without using sophisticated
concepts. In the latter case, the literal per-
ception used by computers, which is often
derided, turns out to be a strength. The
cost of deleting concepts might also be
studied. If the concepts that are inhibited
are infrequent and are not the building
blocks of a large number of other concepts,
the benefits might outweigh the costs. But
what is the threshold? Another solution
with artificial systems is parallelism. A
possibility would be that the original con-
ceptual base stays online while concepts
are inhibited in a copy of the original base
that operates offline.
The examples in this article focus on
finding novel creative solutions without
being bound by prior knowledge. It is an
open question as to exactly what a better
brain would be: more creative, more effi-
cient, more rational, more adaptive, more
altruistic? Answering this question is a
huge challenge in itself, and we should be
alert to our own mindset in defining the
space of possible answers.
The implications for the study of
human cognition and the psychology
expertise in particular are profound. A bet-
ter brain would shed considerable but also
cruel light on the limits of human cog-
nition and expertise. We already had a
preview of this with developments in com-
puter chess. No players, even world cham-
pion Magnus Carlsen, can compete with
computers nowadays. Computers some-
times find moves that are considered by
humans as highly creative, although some
of these moves are just beyond human
discovery. In addition, computers have
led to re-evaluations of large aspects of
the game, in particular openings and
endgames, which humans had researched
for centuries. Be ready to be surprised with
better brains!
Irrespective of possible benefits for sci-
ence and technology, including artificial
intelligence, our proposal for a better brain
raises important questions for the nature
of the human mind. Are qualitative scaling
and quantitative scaling really in opposi-
tion? Is it adaptive to inhibit some con-
cepts “just” to be creative? Why has such a
system not evolved? Is it because, now, we
have the luxury to be creative—courtesy of
cultural evolution?
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